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The debate on the method of philosophy 
at the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries
Edmund Husserl writes, when analysing the understanding of cogni-
tion by Hans Cornelius (1863—1947), which is included in the psycho-
logical trend of Neo-Kantianism — “To show that a scientific move-
ment has gone astray, nothing is more instructive than to study its 
consequences as worked out by its adherents, and so to convince 
oneself that the final theory they think they have gained, has rather 
involved them in self-evident contradictions.”1 This surprising and 
precious remark by Husserl is applicable in analyses devoted to the 
question of method. It is surprising because Husserl talks about his-
tory of philosophy very rarely. However, it is also precious because it 
shows the necessity of consideration of a philosophical question until 
its end in order to show its absurdity. Would it be possible to talk here 
about Husserl’s relating to all those who — following positivism — 
talk about the necessity of verifying cognition. The first to do so was 
physiologist Claude Bernard (1813—1878) who in his book, which 
was an introduction to experimental medicine, formulated rules of 
scientific proceedings, among them the rule of “counter-proof,” which 
was the prototype of the falsification method.2
1 E. H u s s e r l: Logical Investigations. Vol. 1 [Volume II of the German edition]. Trans. 
J.N. F i n d l a y. London, 1970, p. 420.
2 C. B e r n a r d: Introduction a l’étude de la médecine expérimentale. Paris, 1865.
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16 Studies in history of philosophy
“Question of proper method of philosophizing — stresses Leonard 
Nelson (1882—1927) — in modern times was made again the object of 
particular considerations. It is always about opposition of two main 
points of view, which under many names, were emphasized as a dis-
pute between metaphysical and anthropological method, objective 
and subjective, critical and genetic, concerning theory of cognition 
and psychological or transcendental and psychological.”3
First of all one has to underline that Nelson appears here, which 
is directly suggested by the title, as an intercessor of Jakob Friedrich 
Fries and in this sense he inscribes himself in all of the traditions of 
psychological trend of Neo-Kantianism, placing himself in the com-
pany of such thinkers as Jürgen Bona Meyer (1829—1897) and Hans 
Cornelius, although Carl Grapengiesser,4 the author of book about 
the attempts to solve a dispute between Friedrich Adolf Trendelen-
burg and Kuno Fischer,5 is worth mentioning here too. At the same 
time Nelson emphasises two questions. Firstly, he points out at the 
authors of this distinction, who are Kuno Fischer (1824—1907) in 
his vice-rector speech, Paul Natorp (1854—1924),6 Wilhelm Wind-
elband (1848—1915),7 Carl Stumpf (1848—1936)8 and Max Scheler 
(1874—1928).9 However, at the same time he underlines that he 
3 L. N e l s o n: “Jakob Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker.” In: Abhandlungen der 
Frieschen Schule. Neue Folge. Hrsg. von G. H e s s e n b e r g, K. K a i s e r, L. N e l s o n. Bd. 1. 
Heft 2. Göttingen, 1905, p. 241.
4 Actually Christian Andreas Hieronymus Grapengiesser, born on August 9, 1810 in 
Hamburg and died there on May 2, 1883.
5 C. G r a p e n g i e s s e r: Kants Lehre von Raum und Zeit. Kuno Fischer und Adolf Tren­
delenburg. Jena, 1870.
6 P. N a t o r p: “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis.” Philosophi­
sche Monatshefte 1887, Bd. 23, p. 257—286. Polish translation: “O obiektywnym bądź subiekty-
wnym ugruntowaniu poznania.” Trans. W. M a r z ę d a. In: Neokantyzm badeński i marburski. 
Antologia tekstów. [Baden and Marburg Neo­Kantianism. Anthology]. Ed. by: A.J. N o r a s, 
T. K u b a l i c a. Katowice, 2011, pp. 219—240.
7 W. W i n d e l b a n d: Kritische oder genetische Methode? In: I d e m: Präludien. Aufsätze 
und Reden zur Einführung in die Philosophie. 4. Aufl. Bd. 2. Tübingen, 1911, pp. 99—135. 
Polish translation: “Metoda krytyczna czy genetyczna?” Trans. A. P i e t r a s. In: Neokantyzm 
badeński i marburski. Antologia tekstów…, pp. 47—69.
8 C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie.” Abhandlungen der philosophisch­
philologischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften [München] 
1892, Bd. 19, pp. 465—516.
9 M. S c h e l e r: Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode. Eine grundsätzli­
che Erörterung zur philosophischen Methodik. Leipzig, 1900.
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omits the standpoint of Fries, which cannot be surprising under 
any circumstances in this dispute. “In these considerations,” Nelson 
writes, Fries’s method was not taken into account at all. When his 
name is mentioned, it is only as an example to quote the name of 
representative of genetic method or ‘psychologism’.”10 Meanwhile, 
Nelson attempts to prove that Fries’s attitude to psychologism was 
negative, while that towards transcendental method — it was posi-
tive. Nelson refers to Max Scheler as someone who presented the 
newest understanding of transcendental method, which is not con-
sistent with actual state because it means that Nelson did not no-
tice a difference between Scheler’s standpoint and Neo-Kantianism, 
since Scheler criticises both psychologism and transcendentalism to 
the same extent. By the way Nelson points to some places in Fries’s 
works where he refers to transcendental method11 and states that 
Fries is a follower of the transcendental method. Later on Nelson 
starts his polemics with the standpoint of Theodor Elsenhans, which 
was included in his text of 1902,12 because in 1905, when Nelson 
published the article “Jakob Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kri-
tiker,” he could not have known Elsenhans’ book of 1906.13 Taking 
into account Elsenhans’ analysis of relation problem Kant-Fries, 
Nelson underlines that “K a n t  g o t  a c q u a i n t e d  w i t h  p s y -
c h o l o g i c a l  n a t u r e  o f  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  c o g n i t i o n”14 
and, at the same time, he strongly emphasises the fact that it was 
not noticed by Jürgen Bona Meyer either. For the author of Kants 
Psychologie claimed that Fries was mistaken saying that “Kant got 
acquainted with psychological nature of his own investigations.”15
10 L. N e l s o n: Jakob Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker…, p. 241.
11 For example, J.F. F r i e s: System der Logik. Ein Handbuch für Lehrer und zum Selbst­
gebrauch. 3. Aufl. Heidelberg, 1837, pp. 417—418; I d e m: Reinhold, Fichte und Schelling. 
Leipzig, 1803, p. 197.
12 T. E l s e n h a n s: Das Kant­Friesische Problem. Heidelberg, 1902.
13 T. E l s e n h a n s: Fries und Kant. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zur systematischen 
Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie. Bd. 1: Historischer Teil. Jakob Friedrich Fries als 
Er kenntniskritiker und sein Verhältnis zu Kant; Bd. 2: Kritisch Systematischer Teil. Grundle­
gung der Erkenntnistheorie als Ergebnis einer Auseinanderseutzung mit Kant vom Standpunkte 
der Friesischen Problemstellung. Giessen, 1906.
14 L. N e l s o n: Jakob Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker…, p. 297.
15 J. B o n a  M e y e r: Kants Psychologie. Berlin, 1870, p. 143. Cf. L. N e l s o n: Jakob Frie­
drich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker…, p. 299.
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The analysis of philosophical method in the context of Leonard 
Nelson’s critique will be the clearest when it is conducted with 
chronological order. The earliest text is obviously Kuno Fischer’s 
one. Windelband’s text comes from 1883 and Natorp’s from 1887. 
Stumpf’s article was published in 1892 and Scheler published Die 
transzendentale und die psychologische Methode… in 1900. Nelson’s 
attitude and his followers’ will be presented during the analyses, 
if it requires a comment. 
1
Initially, Nelson criticises the arrangements of Kuno Fischer. On 
the occasion of taking the office of vice-rector of Jena University on 
February 1, 1862 Kuno Fischer gave a speech entitled “Die beiden 
kantischen Schulen in Jena” that was published twice in the same 
year: first in Deutsche Vierteljahrs­Schrift,16 and then in the work 
Akademische Reden.17 Kuno Fischer’s speech was an insult to all of 
Fries’s followers, to mention only the most famous individuals, Jür-
gena Bona Meyer, Carl Grapengiesser and Leonard Nelson. On the 
one hand, Kuno Fischer remarks at the beginning of his speech that 
he wants to order the standpoints of Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, Schell-
ing, Hegel, Fries, Herbart and Schopenhauer and present them “how 
they refer to each other according to internal relationships,”18 and 
it is difficult to disagree with his opponents that he does not suc-
ceed in doing this. However, on the other hand one cannot agree 
with the argument of Fries’s defender, that is, Heinrich Eggeling 
16 K. F i s c h e r: “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena.” Deutsche Vierteljahrs­Schrift 
1862, Jahrgang 25, Heft 2, pp. 348—366.
17 K. F i s c h e r: “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena.” In: I d e m: Akademische Reden. 
Stuttgart, 1862, pp. 77—102.
18 Ibid., p. 79.
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(1838—1911), especially as Jakob Friedrich Fries was his grand-
father. “Nearly always,” Eggeling states in his book of 1875 “Fries 
was misunderstood by authors of history of modern philosophy.”19 
The author of these words does not point at Kuno Fischer, but at 
Eduard Zeller who was the author of a thesis on the dependence 
of Fries’s philosophy on the thoughts of Kant and Friedrich Hein-
rich Jacobi (1743—1819). “In his philosophy,” Zeller writes “Fries 
mostly refers to Kant. Like Kant, he expresses a conviction that 
any real philosophy is criticism, that investigating cognitive abili-
ties constitutes the only possible task of human speculation to be 
solved […].”20 Though the problem is, as Zeller notices in relation 
to Fries, Kant’s philosophy is not lacking in mistakes and therefore 
a reference to mental anthropology becomes necessary, and this still 
constitutes a reference to Jacobi’s philosophy.21
“In Königsberg,” Kuno Fischer writes. “there appeared philosophy 
which until now has dominated the course of German speculation 
from which the following systems derive, partially by continuation 
(Fortbildung), and partially by opposition. In Jena, Kant’s philoso-
phy finds its most favourable place, its most significant school and 
its richest and most fruitful development. I will enumerate names: 
R e i n h o l d  the elder, S c h i l l e r, F i c h t e, S c h e l l i n g, H e -
g e l, O k e n, F r i e s.”22 All of these philosophers were connected 
with Jena University. Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758—1823) was 
associated with Jena University in the years 1787—1794 and Jo-
hann Gottlieb Fichte (1762—1814) became his successor and he 
was the head of the Philosophy Department in Jena in the years 
1794—1799. Friedrich Schiller (1759—1805) also gave lectures on 
philosophy in Jena (and also on history) in the years 1789—1799. 
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775—1854) became a pro-
19 H. E g g e l i n g: Kant und Fries. Die anthropologische Auffassung der Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft in ihren wesentlichen Punkten erörtert. Braunschweig, 1875, p. 4.
20 E. Z e l l e r: Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz. 2. Aufl. München, 1875, 
p. 456.
21 “What is the most characteristic are mental investigations by means of which Fries 
wants to justify assumptions of his predecessors more exactly and define their relationship 
more closely.” Ibid., p. 456.
22 K. F i s c h e r: “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena…,” p. 81.
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fessor in Jena in 1798 owing to Goethe’s support, but in 1803 he 
moved to the University in Würzburg. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich He-
gel (1770—1831) was associated with Jena University in the years 
1801—1806 and in 1805 he was appointed an associate professor. 
Lorenz Oken (actually: Okenfuß, 1779—1851) had classes at Jena 
University from 1807—1827, with a break between 1819 and 1822 
that was caused, as it was in Fries’s case, by his being involved 
in the celebration of students’ corporations (Wartburgfest, 1817). 
And finally Jakob Friedrich Fries, who taught at Jena University 
in the years 1801—1805, 1816—1819 (was shortly dismissed after 
Oken) and in 1824—1837. What is more, which is also underlined 
by Kuno Fischer, Artur Schopenhauer (1788—1860) and Johann 
Friedrich Herbart (1776—1841) were also connected with Jena. 
Herbart studied in Jena and attended the lectures of Fichte, while 
Schopenhauer received a doctorate degree in Jena. 
There is no doubt about one thing. Kuno Fischer was right in 
maintaining that the list of philosophers connected with Jena is 
impressive. Moreover, this was a time when even more of them 
were employed there. “At the same time,” Fischer writes, “Schil-
ler, Fichte, Schelling, later Schelling, Hegel, Fries, and later He-
gel, Fries, Oken were here all together.”23 Fischer stresses the fact 
that the first investigator of Kant was Jenie Reinhold, and that his 
system was completed by Fichte, whose theory of knowledge led to 
Schelling’s philosophy of nature and to Hegel’s system. What do 
these two philosophers have in common? “They are,” Fischer claims. 
“seized by the highest leitmotif which they consider to be the ba-
sis of understanding and continuation of Kant’s philosophy.”24 This 
thesis is in accordance with Gerhard Lehmann’s conviction that 
the philosophy of German idealism is based on “philosophy of the 
highest principle” (Grundsatzphilosophie), and that its representa-
tives are: Reinhold, Salomon Maimon (1754—1800), Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte and Jacob Sigismund Beck (1761—1840).25 However, out of 
23 Ibid., p. 84.
24 Ibid., p. 85.
25 See G. L e h m a n n: Geschichte der Philosophie. Bd. 8: Die Philosophie des neunzehnten 
Jahrhunderts I. Berlin, 1953, p. 24.
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the group of thinkers mentioned here, Fischer distinguishes Fries, 
for whom he assigns a special task. “But” Kuno Fischer writes. “an 
opposite direction might be thought in relation to this thought, the 
direction which considers Kant’s philosophy as a basis and from 
this perspective fights continuation introduced by Reinhold. This 
attitude is accepted by Fries. In relation to Kant he takes a posi-
tive and depending stand, while towards development of Kant’s 
philosophy in the understanding of Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling and 
Hegel, he takes definitely polemic stand.”26 Fischer underlines that 
he wants to expose this opposition because, as he claims. “as a mat-
ter of fact it is all about understanding Kant’s philosophy”27 and 
the dispute among representatives of the “philosophy of the highest 
principle” and Fries is, according to Fischer, the most important 
dispute among Jena philosophers. It is worth stressing here that, 
taking into account the significance of Jena University for the state 
of philosophy of the time, this is also the most important dispute 
of German philosophy of those days.
Fischer is right when he stresses the dissimilarity of Fries’s 
standpoint from representatives of German idealism. Fries certainly 
did not look for the highest principle in such a meaning in which 
he built a philosophy of the highest principle — after Reinhold — 
Fichte, and later, Schelling and Hegel used it. “Reinhold,” Kuno 
Fischer says in this context, “started in Jena the first Kant school 
and Fries the last one.”28 Later he calls them the older and the 
younger school. The schools are not equivalent, as far as representa-
tives are concerned because Fischer mentions only one follower of 
Fries, namely his first disciple Ernst Friedrich Apelt (1812—1859), 
although there were other followers along with him — Ernst Si-
gismund Mirbt (1799—1847) was connected with Jena; (Johann) 
Friedrich (August) van Calker (1790—1870), studied at Fries’s and 
at the same time was a professor at Bonn; the theologian Wilhelm 
Martin Leberecht de Wette (1780—1849), who was connected with 
Heidelberg (where he met Fries) and Berlin, and who, like Fries 
26 K. F i s c h e r:  “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena…,” p. 85.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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and Oken, was dismissed from the chair in connection with the 
murder of August von Kotzebue (1761—1819). On March 23, 1819 
the student of theology Karl Ludwig Sand (1795—1820), who after 
Wartburgfest moved to Jena to attend the lectures of Fries, Oken 
and the historian Heinrich Luden (1778—1847), murdered the 
writer, lawyer and Emperor’s spy, August von Kotzebue in Man-
nheim, which was the main reason for the Carlsbad Decrees and 
suspension of Fries who was an avid follower of students corpora-
tions (Burschenschaften).29 The mistake of de Wette consisted in 
the fact that he had sent a letter of condolences to Sand’s mother. 
Another follower of Fries was the biologist and botanist, Matthias 
Jakob Schleiden (1804—1881), who was a professor at Jena Uni-
versity in the years 1839—1863, when he was appointed to Dorpat. 
Fischer does not mention them because he only notes Ernst Frie-
drich Apelt, which for Fischer’s opponents might be an argument 
for not full and objective presentation of Fries’s school. 
“The whole problem of philosophy,” Kuno Fischer writes, “finishes 
with the question: What does critique of reason want to be and what 
can it be? How is it related to the system of philosophy? What is it 
for philosophical study?”30 This question is left in the context of the 
relation between the development of Kant’s philosophy in the frames 
of the “philosophy of highest principle” or in German idealism and 
the one that was characteristic of Fries’s philosophy. Heinrich Moritz 
Chalybäus (1796—1862), one of the thinkers who is included among 
the representatives of speculative theism, when analysing the situ-
ation of post-Kant philosophy, underlines: “The next task after Kant 
was overcoming of subjectivism of his attitude and reaching the real 
knowledge and wanting of truth. This task was also undertaken by 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, and the last one carried them out me-
thodically. However, when it seemed that everything had been fin-
ished in this way, it turned out that this transition from subjectivity 
to objectivity was accomplished at the expense of subjectivity. Thus 
— as the third one — there appears the problem of concrete connec-
29 See more: E.L.T. H e n k e: Jakob Friedrich Fries. Aus seinen handschriftlichen 
Nachlasse dargestellt. Leipzig, 1867, p. 202ff.
30 K. F i s c h e r:  “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena…,” p. 86.
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tion of both sides, and neither objectivity would be lost in subjectiv-
ity in this connection, as it is in the concept of Kant and Fichte, nor 
subjectivity would be lost in objectivity as it happens in the attitude 
of Schelling and Hegel, but they would be both taken into account.”31 
However, Fries who, according to Fischer, played a fundamental role 
for understanding of psychologism was not considered in this analy-
sis, which was expressed in the fifth volume of his Geschichte der 
neuern Philosophie, writing: “The question about establishing of,” 
he explains in the introduction to the fifth volume of his Geschichte 
der neuern Philosophie, “transcendental ability discovered by Kant 
coincides with the question: What is critique? What can only be more 
consistent: psychology or metaphysics? Here is a disputable matter 
which divides post-Kant philosophy into two different trends. What 
is the cognition of human reason if not self-knowledge, self-observa-
tion, psychology? Some say so. How can one want psychology to be 
basic philosophical study when it must be established itself — like 
every empirical study? Others answer like this. […] Psychological 
continuation and renewing of Kant’s criticism, so — called anthro-
pological criticism, find their essential presentation at J.F. F r i e s 
and his followers.”32
Kuno Fischer — and this was also reflected in volumes of his Ge­
schichte der neuern Philosophie,33 devoted to Kant — emphasises the 
fact that Kant’s intention consisted in distinguishing between the 
critique of reason and the system of reason. However, this distinction 
leads to definite consequences among which one has to be pointed out: 
31 H.M. C h a l y b ä u s: Historische Entwickelung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant 
bis Hegel. Zu näherer Verständigung des wissenschaftlichen Publicums mit der neuesten 
Schule. 5. Aufl. Leipzig, 1860, p. 343.
32 K. F i s c h e r: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. Bd. 5: Fichte und seine Vorgänger. 
Heidelberg, 1869, p. 14.
33 K. F i s c h e r: Immanuel Kant. Entwicklungsgeschichte und System der kritischen Phi­
losophie. Bd. 1: Entstehung und Begründung der kritischen Philosophie. Die Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft; Bd. 2: Das Lehrgebäude der kritischen Philosophie. Das System der reinen Vernunft. 
Mannheim, 1860; I d e m: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. Bd. 3: Kants Vernunftkritik und 
deren Entstehung; Bd. 4: Kants System der reinen Vernunft auf Grund der Vernunftkritik. 2. 
rev. Aufl. Heidelberg, 1869; I d e m: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. Bd. 3—4: Immanuel 
Kant und seine Lehre; Bd. 1: Entstehung und Grundlegung der kritischen Philosophie; Bd. 2: 
Das Vernunftsystem auf der Grundlage der Vernunftkritik. 3. neu bearb. Aufl. München, 1882.
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“[…] human reason is divided into many source (ursprünglicher) pow-
ers! Isn’t reason the o n e  (eine)?”34 It seems that this is the classic 
problem of relation: one of many; however, Fischer is still convinced 
that this is a contradiction impossible to overcome, and such attitude 
automatically locates him by the side of followers of  “philosophy of the 
highest principle.” It seems that Fries’s defenders are actually right in 
this aspect — Fischer was not objective in his assessment of his inten-
tions to the end. One has to distinguish two questions, namely Fries’s 
intention and its result. The intention was to show that, after all, one 
can find a source of unity in man, and that there is no need to look for 
this outside of him. The source does not have to be the highest princi-
ple (Grundsatz), and if so the source of unity might be the human soul. 
“We possess,” Kuno Fischer writes in this context, “the concept of hu-
man soul which is contradictory in itself: psychology which does not 
agree with logic.”35 Therefore, Fischer emphasises the need for unity 
but he thinks that this question should be solved in a different way. 
“In one reason,” Fischer continues, confirming his access to those 
who consider the necessity of pointing to the highest principle, 
“there are a lot of identical powers. I d e n t i t y  is becoming a slo-
gan. The problem should be solved with the help of the notion of 
identity. With every step one takes the solution will become more 
significant.”36 Thus, to the author of Die beiden kantischen Schulen 
in Jena the philosophy of identity seems to be the only solution to 
the problem that was not solved by the author of critical philoso-
phy. Fischer pays attention to the opponents of “identity philosophy” 
who are connected with Jena, namely Schopenhauer and Herbart 
who agree with its followers anyway. Schopenhauer recognises the 
principle of identity and the fact that metaphysics constitutes the 
foundation of philosophy. While Herbart agrees with them, Fis-
cher thinks that metaphysics is the first study. “Basic philosophi-
cal study,” Fischer states. “is n o t  metaphysics. This explanation 
is against philosophers of identity and against Herbart.”37 There 
34 K. F i s c h e r:  “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena…,” p. 88. 
35 Ibid., p. 89.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 92.
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is no doubt that Fischer’s thesis is a thesis conditioned by his at-
titudes because it certainly cannot be accepted by the followers 
of metaphysical Neo-Kantianism, such as his disciple Otto Lieb-
mann, and also Johannes Volkelt, Friedrich Paulsen and others. 
It is rightly believed by Hans-Ludwig Ollig that Liebmann did not 
adopt an understanding of post-Kant philosophy after his teacher 
because he created his own optics of the perception of this develop-
ment, in which the notion of “the thing-in-itself”38 occupies the cen-
tral position. The most well-known Liebmann work, the one that is 
considered to give the beginning of Neo-Kantianism (although this 
question is not unequivocal), namely Kant und die Epigonen, was 
written in this optics.39 Obviously, the point is not to immediately 
accept the beliefs of Liebmann and his followers. The problem is 
that both Fischer and Liebmenn, when assessing post-Kant phi-
losophy, locate themselves in the tradition of understanding it in 
the light of the defined premises. However, this is understandable 
under the condition that every criticism appears as a breach in the 
wall because only this helps ex post to accomplish the assessment 
of the whole. At the same time, in this specific situation it means 
both Fischer and Liebmann may be right. A historian of philoso-
phy, who is investigating the relations between philosophers, has 
to take into account the beliefs of both of these thinkers. 
“However,” Fischer asks, “what is the critique of reason if not 
metaphysics? This is the cognition of human reason and its pow-
ers. This self-cognition is only possible due to self-observation, that 
is, inner experience. The study of experience is the study of na-
ture [Naturlehre]. Inner study of experience is inner study of nature 
[Naturlehre], that is, anthropology, more psychology, empirical psy-
chology. Therefore, the critique of reason, if it is properly understood, 
is an empirical study of soul. Its contents is anthropological, its cog-
nition — empirical. F r i e s  takes exactly such standpoint.”40 Fries’s 
followers refer specifically to these arrangements to show that he 
38 See H.-L. O l l i g: Der Neukantianismus. Stuttgart, 1979, p. 11.
39 O. L i e b m a n n: Kant und die Epigonen. Eine kritische Abhandlung. Stuttgart, 1865.
40 K. F i s c h e r:  “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena…,” p. 92. Cf. I d e m: Geschichte 
der neuern Philosophie…, Bd. 5, p. 14.
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was not properly understood and they consider Kuno Fischer to be 
the main culprit who identified Fries as the one taking polemic at-
titude towards the philosophy of identity. Fischer admittedly claims 
that when it is about posing a question, the spirit of Fries’s philoso-
phy is that of Kant, and this means that Fries poses the question in 
the same way as Kant. The problem is, however, Fischer continues, 
that Fries’s standpoint amounts to an alternative: if the critique of 
reason cannot be metaphysical, then it has to be anthropological. 
And from this he concludes the following: “If its insights cannot be 
a priori so they cannot be anything else but empirical insights.”41 
Fischer is convinced that the assessment of the opponents made by 
Fries is very objective but the direction in which he develops Kant’s 
philosophy is not acceptable to Fischer. 
“Therefore, according to Fries the basic philosophical study is 
not metaphysics but anthropology in the meaning of inner study 
on nature [Naturlehre], that is mental anthropology. This is the 
right philosophia prima. Critique of reason, as well as metaphysical 
cognition, a system of philosophy in its dismemberment, are based 
on this anthropological basis.”42 Kuno Fischer’s standpoint in this 
question is different from the one which is taken by Fries and his 
followers. For already in the next sentence Fischer underlines that 
“Kant’s criticism did n o t  want to be anthropological.”43 For Fis-
cher this means the dissimilarity of Fries’s attitude to the one that 
was the starting point, namely to Kant and therefore Fischer talks 
about renewing Kant’s criticism. “He made it,” Fischer writes about 
Fries, “in his ‘Neue Kritik der Vernunft’, which is anything else but 
anthropological transformation of Kant’s critique of reason, in its 
most part it is a translation of the latter one into the language of 
empirical psychology.”44 It was not a problem for Fries’s followers 
that Fischer understood him as a continuator of Kant’s philosophy. 
For, undoubtedly, the author of Neue Kritik der Vernunft is a thinker 
who takes up the problem of establishing critical philosophy afresh, 
41 K. F i s c h e r:  “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena…,” p. 92.
42 Ibid., p. 94.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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taking into account the impossibility of accepting this direction of 
Kant’s development of philosophy which was accepted within the 
framework of “the highest principle” or “philosophy of identity.” In 
this case it seems that Kuno Fischer is also in the right. “Fichte and 
Fries,” he writes, “remain on the opposite poles, closely related to 
Kant’s philosophy.”45 The problem here is the reproach of establish-
ing philosophy in psychology, which is reflected in anthropological 
attitude, according to Fischer. It is interesting that the idea of com-
pleting psychology is found in another thinker of that time, namely 
Rudolph Hermann Lotze, who said that the philosophy of history 
seemed to him a “necessary completion of psychology and hence the 
plan of making an attempt of anthropology which would look for all 
the meaning of human existence on the basis of combined considera-
tion of individual life and the history of our species culture.”46 There 
are even more similarities because they both combine the problem 
of anthropology with a priori reasoning although Lotze considers 
ethics as the first study because he claims that metaphysics and 
logic have to be established in ethics. 
A fundamental mistake of Fischer — from the perspective of Fries’s 
followers with Jürgen Bona Meyer and later Leonard Nelson — con-
sists in the fact that he rejects the possibility of an anthropological 
approach to the critique of reason. “For if the critique of reason is only 
anthropological, it is understandable that primary contents of the rea-
son must be given, that it must be directly present in our inside; it is 
understandable that we do not create the contents but we only realize 
this; that to this unity reason needs to have power, by virtue of which 
it reflects its inner processes; that this power of reflection does not 
create anything but it can only observe what is given, explain what 
is dark, that — to be able to do the last one — the power of reflection 
must have an ability to willful approaching to the one or another.”47 
Because, according to Fischer, intellect is this power for Fries, there-
fore “our intellectual cognition is nothing else but renewed awareness, 
45 Ibid.
46 H. L o t z e: Streitschriften. Erstes Heft: In Bezug auf Prof. I.H. Fichte’s Anthropologie. 
Leipzig, 1857, p. 15.
47 K. F i s c h e r:  “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena…,” p. 95.
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¢n£mnhsij.”48 In this way, in Fischer’s opinion, Fries betrays Kant’s 
teaching. Primary rational cognition is not given through intellect but 
is given to intellect. Intellect does not create it but only realises and 
this is tightly connected with the feeling of truth (Wahrheitsgefühl), 
which is characteristic of Fries’s philosophy, as Fischer thinks. Fis-
cher claims that Fries goes back to such philosophers like:
a) John Locke and David Hume — considering intellect to be empty;
b) Leibniz — convinced that human reason possesses source cogni-
tions which he only realizes owing to abstraction (reflection);
c) Thomas Reid (1710—1796) and Dugald Stewart (1753—1828) — 
convinced that this direct cognition might be compared to com-
mon sense;
d) Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de 
Wette — convinced that this emotional factor in cognition is 
equivalent to bringing man over sensual world.49 
Thus, another big problem appears in the assessment of Fries’s philo-
sophy. The first one consisted in reference to psychology and anthropo-
logy which are of empirical character. The second problem, which is of 
the same significance, refers to the fact that Fries’s philosophy is not de 
facto — as it seemed to all supporters of the author of Neue Kritik der 
Vernunft — a development of Kant’s philosophy but rather a return to 
pre-Kantian philosophy. This insult is justified by Fischer by Fries’s 
vision of a priori cognition. Fischer underlines that Fries’s intention is 
consistent with Kant’s intention, that is, that critique of reason is to 
be “cognition of a priori cognition. But this cognition is not only a prio­
ri.”50 Fischer thinks that Fries draws a conclusion that transcendental 
cognition is not a transcendental cognition at all and such attitude is 
called “transcendental superstition” or “Kant’s superstition.”51
The problem consists in the fact that a criticism of cognition is 
supposed to be, Fischer thinks, a self-cognition according to Fries, 
and therefore it should be of a psychological character. Fischer asks: 
“Is there another way of self-cognition than the way of observing 
psychology? Isn’t all cognition of our inside a psychological insight 
48 Ibid.
49 See ibid., pp. 96—97.
50 Ibid., p. 97.
51 Ibid.
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[Einsicht]?”52 Fischer uses the notion beobachtende Psychologie and 
one has to think if there is no reference to the notion of “observing 
mind” (beobachtende Vernunft) present in Hegel’s The Phenomenol­
ogy of Spirit.53 However, irrespective of this, there was a problem 
that for many years would dominate the discussion on understand-
ing Kant’s philosophy. For Fischer underlines that this psychol-
ogy leads to insights that are of an empirical character and only 
empirical ones. “The critique of reason, as Fries wants, is an inner 
experience, empirical study on soul and nothing else.”54 In a criti-
cism of reason that is understood in such a way, there is no place 
for a priori cognition. While Fries thinks that what is a priori might 
be discovered a posteriori, Fischer is of different opinion. “W h a t 
i s  a priori c a n n o t  b e  r e c o g n i z e d  a posteriori.”55 At the 
same time he expresses the conviction that Fries’s philosophy does 
not fulfil the condition that justifies insights into cognition because 
these insights are of a psychological, empirical character, and thus 
they can deliver a priori cognitions. “What is,” Fischer writes, “self-
observation? I am observing only myself. What I find in this obser-
vation does not have, first of all, any right to be of importance to 
everyone. Where does common importance of results remain? In this 
observation I only behave empirically. What I recognize through ex-
perience should not and cannot lay claims to strict necessity. Where 
does necessity of result remain? So, if the critique of reason does 
not want to be anything else but an empirical observation, where 
is common and necessary importance of its insights: Where, I am 
asking, does it remain a critique of reason without it?”56
However, Fischer’s critics do not notice that he can perceive the 
problem posed by Fries after all and emphasises that, as a matter 
of fact, the anthropological approach of criticism belongs to critical 
philosophy. For the problem is more complicated than Fries’s fol-
lowers notice — who want to prove the authenticity and rightness 
52 Ibid., p. 98.
53 See G.W.F. H e g e l: Phänomenologie des Geistes. Hrsg. Von J. Schulze. 2. Aufl. Ber-
lin, 1841, p. X.
54 K. F i s c h e r:  “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena…,” p. 98.
55 Ibid., p. 99.
56 Ibid., p. 100.
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of the interpretation that was by the spiritual master. “The ques-
tion if criticism of reason should be metaphysical or anthropological 
has been an authentic unavoidable problem in the history of Ger-
man philosophy since Kant. And the spirit of philosophy lives with 
problems.”57 Thus, there is a problem about considering the essence 
of critical philosophy. If the matter was approached like this, then 
Fries could be perceived as one who was trying to develop Kant’s 
philosophy. However, the problem consists in the fact that earlier 
— in the sentence already mentioned — Fischer wrote that “Kant’s 
critique did n o t  want to be anthropological one.”58 At the same 
time he somehow neglected the relation between Kant and Fries 
and he gave Fries’s followers a strong argument in the discussion 
over the shape of critical philosophy.
2
Another important text that appears in the chronological order, and 
to which Nelson refers, is Wilhelm Windelband’s text of 1883, enti-
tled Critical or genetic method?59 The author addresses the problem 
of psychology already before although the text devoted to critical 
and genetic method is considered as the most important.“In 1876,” 
Hermann Glockner writes about Windelband, “he became a profes-
sor of philosophy in Zurich and in his opening speech he demanded 
for the first time the division between empirical psychology and 
a priori philosophy.”60 Glockner means the text entitled Pessimismus 
57 Ibid., p. 101.
58 Ibid.
59 W. W i n d e l b a n d: Kritische oder genetische Methode? In: I d e m: Präludien. Aufsätze 
und Reden zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte. 9. Aufl. 2. Bd. Tübingen, 1924, pp. 99—135.
60 H. G l o c k n e r: Die europäische Philosophie von den Anfängen bir zur Gegenwart. 
Stuttgart, 1958, p. 992.
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und Wissenschaft.61 One year later Windelband was appointed at 
Freiburg im Breisgau University and gave a speech entitled Über 
Denken und Nachdenken.62 Obviously, it is not possible to take into 
account all of Windelband’s works but it is worth paying attention 
to still another text in which he makes a famous distinction be-
tween the idiographic and nomothetic sciences. This is important 
from the point of view of the discussion about the subject of phi-
losophy, although in this speech — I mean rector’s speech which 
was given by Windelband in Strassburg in 1894 — Fries’s name 
does not appear. I am referring to the text entitled Geschichte und 
Naturwissenschaft.63 The analysis of articles devoted to the method 
mentioned by Nelson cannot omit the answer to the question: Why 
does the latter text, considering Windelband, refer first of all to 
a text that was devoted to critical and genetic method? Well, there 
are two reasons. Firstly, because Windelband had already mentioned 
Kant’s opposition to psychologism in the first sentence of the arti-
cle, which was not the common interpretation. “Since in Critique of 
pure reason, which as we know does not intend to be a system of 
philosophy but rather a ‘treatise on method’, Kant had been looking 
for a new approach to the task and the way of knowing philosophy 
which could be in opposition to modern psychologism, the question 
on the essence of his method did not disappear from the agenda of 
philosophy.”64 However, the problem is that Kant’s science was not 
defined unequivocally and therefore it enables such interpretations 
as well. Secondly, because Fries’s name appears in the context of 
psychologism. Windelband analyses modern trends and claims that 
all of them owe their popularity to Kant’s philosophy. “At last psy-
chologism,” as represented by Fries and Beneke or in such a form 
as it was developed anew by a trend of popular psychology, “owes 
any advantage, which it certainly has over proper earlier theories, 
61 W. W i n d e l b a n d: Pessimismus und Wissenschaft. In: I d e m: Präludien…, Bd. 2, 
pp. 195—220.
62 W. W i n d e l b a n d: Über Denken und Nachdenken. In: I d e m: Präludien…, Bd. 2, 
pp. 24—58.
63 W. W i n d e l b a n d: Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft. In: I d e m: Präludien…, Bd. 2, 
pp. 136—160.
64 W. W i n d e l b a n d: Kritische oder genetische Methode?…, p. 99.
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to joining a critical philosophy.”65 Obviously, there is the problem 
of confusing the critical method with the metaphysical method, the 
same as considering transcendental dialectics as the core of critical 
philosophy is a problem as well. Windelband is convinced that the 
source of the misunderstanding around Kant’s notion of apriority 
lies in this. “Kant himself,” Windelband adds, “should be blamed 
for the fact that a new notion of apriority was very fast brought to 
the old psychological prius and at the same time he allowed to get 
to know the value of his discovery.”66
Windelband points to the fact that the deductive method and 
the inductive method are not properly understood, and that their 
opposition is exaggerated. This is expressed in the statement that 
the deductive method uses only axioms in its proofs and inductive 
method — impressions. However, it is not the most important from 
the point of view of philosophy. “[…] t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  p h i -
l o s o p h y,” Windelband writes, “i s  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  a x i o m s. 
The essence of axioms is that they cannot be proved. One cannot 
prove them in a deductive way because they determine the basis 
of any deduction themselves and also because that even more gen-
eral and direct, and at the same time higher axioms should be in-
dicated to such proof. They cannot be proved in an inductive way 
either because any induction assumes validity of axioms within 
some earlier defined domain. As it results, philosophy cannot make 
use of deductive method or inductive method which are something 
ordinary in other sciences.”67 According to Windelband the aim of 
philosophy is, first of all, to prove direct obviousness of axioms. 
This is essential in the context of the following fragment: “There 
is no l o g i c a l  necessity which could prove importance of axioms. 
Therefore, there are only two possibilities: either one has to prove 
an a c t u a l  importance, looking for the evidence that these axioms 
will be actually recognized as important ones in the real process 
of human representations, wishes and feelings, that they are bind-
ing, recognized principles in the empirical reality of spiritual life, 
65 Ibid., p. 100.
66 Ibid., p. 101.
67 Ibid., p. 108.
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or one has to prove that they are entitled to a different necessity, 
namely t h e o l o g i c a l  n e c e s s i t y, and their importance has to 
be obligatorily recognized if other aims are to be realized.”68 The 
problem of importance, as it is generally known, is essential for 
the philosophy of Baden School and was adopted from the consid-
erations of Rudolph Hermann Lotze. With reference to these ideas, 
Lotze thinks that Plato separated existence from things, and in 
this context he emphasises the separation of two realities, namely 
“reality entitled to ideas and laws as i m p o r t a n c e  from reality 
of a thing as b e i n g.”69 This is where the most well-known Lotze 
formula appears: “being is and values are in force.” Windelband is 
convinced that one has to distinguish between two approaches of 
philosophy, namely the genetic approach from the critical approach. 
“For genetic method,” the founder of the Baden School writes, “axi-
oms are actual ways of approach which were created in the course 
of development of human representations, feelings and will’s deci-
sions and this is what provides them with importance. For criti-
cal method […] axioms are norms which are important assuming 
that thinking in a commonly accepted way aims at realizing the 
purpose of being in truth, will — the purpose of being good, and 
feeling — the purpose of grasping beauty.”70 In other words, the 
genetic method is a method of cognition that refers to the origin 
of cognition, while the critical method is based on the assumption 
that the validity of axioms has nothing to do with their origin.
The distinction between the genetic method and the critical method 
is certainly nothing new in the history of philosophy; just the oppo-
site — one may consider it to be only a reminder of Kant’s approach 
towards the epistemological standpoints of contemporary times. As is 
widely known, reconciliation of dogmatism with skepticism is a very 
important issue in Kant’s philosophy. The thinker from Königsberg 
attributes merits to David Hume’s philosophy, which is emphasised 
in the introduction to Prolegomena. “I honestly admit: David Hume’s 
68 Ibid.
69 H. L o t z e: System der Philosophie. Erster Theil: Drei Bücher der Logik. Leipzig, 1874, 
p. 507.
70 W. W i n d e l b a n d: Kritische oder genetische Methode?…, p. 109.
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reprimand was just this first signal which broke my dogmatic nap 
many years ago and put on a totally different direction of my investi-
gation in the field of speculative philosophy.”71 However, the problem 
of Hume’s philosophy consists in the fact that in fighting against the 
dogmatism of the past metaphysics, it moved to the other extreme, 
namely into skepticism. So breaking a dogmatic nap consists in the 
necessity of finding a third way by Kant. Because, as was noticed by 
Hans-Michael Baumgartner, because Kant could not see the possibil-
ity of taking any indirect stand he turned to criticism.72 Regardless 
of the fact of how he solved the problem of cognition in the context of 
the disputes from previous times, the only important thing here is 
that fact that Windelband remains in an analogous situation, namely 
he has to consider the problem in confrontation with positivism and 
its varieties. One such danger is connected with psychologism. “To 
every such ‘theory’ there belongs a big, extensive material of either 
psychological cognitions or psychological and historical cognitions.”73 
In this context this can be understood as a reference to Fries although 
his name was mentioned only once in the article.
The problem is more complicated and deals with the way in which 
philosophy justifies its axioms. Windelband refers to Richard Avenar-
ius and his “pure experience” though he underlines that it is impossi-
ble to reach anything but relativism on its basis. Because an absolute 
criterion cannot be found, there is no other way but to submit to the 
facts. This question has been discussed many time in post-Kantian 
philosophy. Klaus Ch. Köhnke points at the Reinhold’s disciple, and 
later the professor in Kiel, namely Johann Erich von Berger (1772—
71 I. K a n t: Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird 
auftreten können. In: I d e m: Gesammelte Schriften. Bd. 4: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1. Aufl.), 
Prolegomena, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der 
Naturwissenschaft. Berlin, 1911, p. 260.
72 “Der Gegensatz Dogmatismus versus Skeptizismus führte Kant, da hier eine aus-
gleichende Vermittlung der Sache nach nicht möglich war, zur Ablehnung beider Alternativen 
und damit zu einer dritten philosophischen Position, zum transzendentalen Kritizismus.” 
H.-M. B a u m g a r t n e r: Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Anleitung zur Lektüre. 4. Aufl. 
Freiburg—München, 1996, p. 21. More on this topic, see A.J. N o r a s: Kant a neokantyzm 
badeński i marburski. Katowice, 2005, pp. 94—95.
73 W. W i n d e l b a n d: Kritische oder genetische Methode?…, p. 113.
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1833)74 who was one of the first to criticize philosophy and science in-
troduced by one rule.75 He did this in his four-volume work Allgemeine 
Grundzüge zur Wissenschaft (1817—1827) although it was von Berger, 
who though that the system might be deductive and a priori (Reinhold 
and Fichte), panlogic or methodical and encyclopaedic (Hegel) and ro-
mantic and connected with point of view, who typologised philosophi-
cal systems76 because he believed that the problem of the system was 
connected with the desire to grasp the whole and that it was important 
to realise the impossibility of a holistic grasp of reality. The tendency 
to such understanding of philosophy was becoming clearer and this 
is reflected in the texts of Trendelenburg and later in the thought of 
Windelband. Mainly Karl Jaspers and Nicolai Hartmann followed this 
train of thought in the20th century. It is interesting that Köhnke sees 
this as a symptom of romanticism. “This no- or no-longer a system of 
von Berger and Trendelenburg is what is romantic. This is a system of 
emphasising of scientific value of individual phenomena in relation to 
any thinking about principles (Prinzipiendenken) — this is a system 
of positive natural, historical, philological and historico-philosophical 
knowledge.”77 It seems that the problem is more complex than Köhnke 
thinks but we cannot learn more about this question. “Philosophy,” 
as Windelband writes in this context, “is nothing else for this than 
psychological-cultural-historical consideration based on axioms. It 
is a ‘hopeless attempt’ of establishing in empirical theory something 
that constitutes itself an assumption of any theory.”78 As we are talk-
ing about psychology, Fries’s followers might feel offended here. On 
the other hand, in  another place, Windelband talks about two pos-
sible approaches in philosophy that deal with the starting point for 
criticism and thus concentrate on the self-cognition of human mind. 
Followers of the first one consider mental anthropology as a basis for 
74 Ludwig Noack informs that von Berger died in 1831 while he was a rector. See 
L. N o a c k: Philosophie­geschichtliches Lexikon. Historisch­biographisches Handwörterbuch 
zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Leipzig, 1879, p. 134.
75 See K.Ch. K ö h n k e: Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus. Die deutsche Uni­
versitätsphilosophie zwischen Idealismus und Positivismus. Frankfurt am Main, 1993, p. 25.
76 See ibid., p. 31. 
77 Ibid., p. 32.
78 W. W i n d e l b a n d: Kritische oder genetische Methode?…, p. 113.
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investigating while the followers of the second one think that history 
is a tool of philosophy. “It is,” Windelband claims, “[…] an opposition 
of Fries’s anthropologism towards historical idealism of Hegel.”79 Win-
delband does not support Fries in this question either, which aroused 
the opposition of Nelson.
3
Chronological order now requires a reference to Paul Natorp, co-
founder of the Marburg School, who published an article entitled “Über 
objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis” (On objective or 
subjective establishing of cognition) in 1887, in the magazine Philoso­
phische Monatshefte. A year later Natorp published a very important 
book entitled Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode80 
and chapter fourteen of this book has a similar title, namely Objec­
tive und subjective Begründung der Erkenntnis. Wahrheit und Schein 
des Idealismus. In 1912 Natorp published another book on psychology 
that he entitled Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Metho de. It 
was signed as the first book but second part never appeared.81 In the 
article mentioned above, Natorp poses the question of whether the es-
tablishment of the cognition that happens in logic should be objective 
or subjective. By the way there a problem with understanding of the 
role of psychology in the theory of cognition now appears.
The answer to the question of why Nelson refers to Natorp’s article 
is easy — because the latter one refers to Fries. “If — Natorp writes 
79 W. W i n d e l b a n d: Die Geschichte der Philosophie. In: I d e m: Die Philosophie im 
Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. Festschrift für Kuno Fischer. Bd. 2. Heidelberg, 1905, 
p. 184.
80 P. N a t o r p: Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode. Freiburg im Breis-
gau, 1888.
81 P. N a t o r p: Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode. Erstes Buch: Objekt und 
Methode der Psychologie. Tübingen, 1912.
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in the article “On objective or subjective establishing of cognition,” 
— “we attribute cognition ‘objective’ importance, then […] it has to 
be established in subjectivity of cognition; it must have its source in 
acting or subjective experiencing of cognition. The ‘act’ of cognition 
seems to be, out of necessity, what is the first one, while cognition — 
considered as a value — the result depending on this act or its crea-
tion. The ‘product’ might be called objective, ‘factors’ are subjective. 
Of course, in accordance with this view logic is becoming inevitably 
dependent on psychology — this is a conclusion which did not frighten 
consistent followers of subjective viewpoint. Kant — who appoints 
a historical starting point — represents an opposite standpoint with 
unambiguous resolution just in this question. But already one of his 
first and also the most loyal followers — Fries — was correcting Kant 
in this place, believing that he has to restore appropriate psychologi-
cal bases to transcendental philosophy.”82 Yet, logic cannot depend 
on psychology on any account, and generally speaking, it cannot de-
pend on any other detailed science. “All that believe in a possibility 
of such science,” Natorp continues, “would define it as science which 
is characterized by far more fundamental importance than any other. 
The science which according to the name and claims talks about cog-
nition and its rules in general, cannot depend on any other scientific 
cognition (which can only be true in accordance with its laws) in its 
establishing. Quite opposite. It must be the basis of all sciences.”83
In addition to Fries’s standpoint as defended by Nelson, one has 
to mention yet another question that Natorp treated very earnestly 
in the book, namely complexity of consciousness. “In the fact of con-
sciousness,” Natorp explains in Einleitung in die Psychologie nach 
kritischer Methode, “there can be a lot of moments distinguished which 
are really inseparably connected but in consideration they have to 
be necessarily separated: firstly, the contents which one is aware of 
(contents of consciousness); secondly, its being aware [Bewusst­sein] 
or its reference to Me; this last one, on the way to farther abstrac-
tion might be distinguished, as the third moment of the fact of con-
82 P. N a t o r p: “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis…,” pp. 261—
262.
83 Ibid., p. 264.
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sciousness, from the very reference.”84 For this reason Natorp intro-
duces the notion of “realisation” (Bewusstheit). In principle one can 
say that it is introduced by Natorp after Hermann Cohen who had 
done it for the first time in 1877 in the work Kants Begründung der 
Ethik in which he used this notion six times,85 mostly in the polem-
ics about the attitude of the physicist and astronomer, Johann Carl 
Friedrich Zöllner (1834—1882) who, in 1872, published the second 
edition of his work devoted to the notion of cognition.86 It is essential 
to define realisation as used in this work because Cohen says: “[…] 
the fact of impression (that is r e a l i z a t i o n ).”87 Later he uses this 
term in Das Princip der Infinitesimal­Methode und seine Geschichte 
of 1883. “One should not also ask,” Cohen writes there, “h o w  d o e s 
i t  h a p p e n  that there occurs such relation of the consciousness to 
what is given; for such a question exceeds the borders of scientific 
thirst for knowledge because it is not directed at conditions and kinds 
of s c i e n t i f i c  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  but at a  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f 
n a t u r a l  consciousness, r e a l i s a t i o n. It is practically a  t r a n s -
c e n d e n t  question.”88 So when, two years later, Cohen published the 
second, considerably extended edition of Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, 
the notion of “realisation” appears there more often. One has to ad-
mit that from the perspective of the second edition, which was much 
more modest, this notion was not used by the author. “To reserve the 
unity of consciousness to a fundamental problem, as the most concise 
expression, there seems to be essential a distinction in the notion of 
consciousness, aiming at the direction that some extraordinary ways 
of psychological presentation of the unity of consciousness cannot be 
mistaken any more — also in the word in which the meaning of con-
sciousness for critical and cognitive problem has been reserved. To 
prevent this I will use the notion not used by Kant r e a l i s a t i o n 
(Bewussheit), as distinct from consciousness. Therefore, a question 
84 P. N a t o r p: Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode…, p. 11.
85 See H. C o h e n: Kants Begründung der Ethik. Berlin, 1877, pp. 46, 181, 182.
86 J.C.F. Z ö l l n e r: Über die Natur der Cometen. Geschichte und Theorie der Erkenntniss. 
2. Aufl. Leipzig, 1872.
87 H. C o h e n: Kants Begründung der Ethik…, p. 182.
88 H. C o h e n: Das Princip der Infinitesimal­Methode und seine Geschichte. Ein Kapitel 
zur Grundlegung der Erkenntnisskritik. Berlin, 1883, p. 20.
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‘how could this happen’ that space is created from impression is the 
question about realisation.”89 
If we take into consideration Natorp’s article, two issues are impor-
tant. The first one is the understanding of cognition; the second one is 
the distinction between two ways of establishing of cognition. “If cogni-
tion is considered as a problem, analogously to an equation which we 
are to solve, the object is not defined yet, looked for but only a given 
described as x. This x is not just something unknown; but similarly 
like x in an equation it is defined by connection with already known 
quantities. The same is with the object of cognition — also before its 
solution — it has to be defined as for its meaning by definite reference 
to the data of cognition. Otherwise, the problem of getting to know 
the object would be both insolvable and incomprehensible.”90 Such an 
understanding of cognition is based on an assumption that cognition 
is an interminable process of reaching truth and — with regard to the 
fact that Nicolai Hartmann later refers to it — it can be called the 
Marburg notion of cognition. Of course, the meaning that Marburg 
philosophers emphasised was its infinite character. Natorp underlines 
this in his program text of 1912 in which he writes: “ ‘Being actually 
given’ — is defining the character of a problem to be solved — just 
the problem of the source proof, the proof based on the unity of acting. 
This problem might appear to be infinite, it always counts as the last 
one, but that is why it is always a problem. It does not give, it cannot 
give what is given in the meaning of definite, closed, taken from the 
cognition that is still in proceeding ahead. Actually I emphasize the 
character of cognition p r o c e s s  in the same meaning, its character 
as fieri and not motionless, isolated fact, that is just as becoming ac-
cording to Plato: becoming the being, movement towards the being and 
not stopping at the resting being.”91 Cognition is perceived dynami-
cally here, as a process and it was also perceived in this way by the 
most prominent — next to Ernst Cassirer — disciple of Marburgians, 
namely Nicolai Hartmann. “In the light of critical consideration,” he 
89 H. C o h e n: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. 2. neubearb. Aufl. Berlin, 1885, p. 207. Cf. 
I d e m: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. 3. Aufl. Berlin, 1918, p. 270.
90 P. N a t o r p: “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis…,” p. 258.
91 P. N a t o r p: “Kant und die Marburger Schule.” Kant­Studien 1912, Bd. 17, p. 200.
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writes in an article about the Marburg times, “there exists no system 
as a starting point, but only an aim, a demand. For philosophical cog-
nition the system is not the beginning but the end. This end is never 
present, ready; for philosophical cognition is never ready.”92 After all 
Natorp wrote: “Before the r e s u l t  of cognition there is something 
given indeed; namely a p r o b l e m. One may also say: the object is 
given as something still to define, as x and not a known quantity.”93
As far as objectivity is concerned Natorp opposes it to the stand-
point of psychologism which is represented, in his opinion, by Fries. 
“It is easy to notice,” Natorp writes in the answer to Fries’s atti-
tude, “that our initial arrangements are rather aiming at opposite 
standpoint.”94 In an opposing psychological understanding of cogni-
tion Natorp will underline that “objective importance must also be 
objectively established.”95 Science has to be of an objective character 
and “objectivity to which science claims rights undoubtedly deals 
with importance which seriously — and not only apparently — over-
comes subjectivity of consciousness.”96 In connection with this Natorp 
opposes two standpoints. According to the first standpoint: “Objects 
exist in themselves, beyond and subjectivity, independently of it and 
without a source reference to it. It is true that it is represented to us 
by subjective presentation but it only represents (replaces or means) 
the object and it is not an object. Therefore objectivity is not abol-
ished in subjectivity.”97 The other way is a search in which the start-
ing point does not have a connection with the object that is “at first 
one has to place oneself in the position of cognition and ask how the 
very cognition understands objectivity, how it receives it and what it 
means to the cognition that is opposes the object to itself as independ-
ent of subjectivity of cognition?”98 Thus, the question of the objectivity 
of cognition is connected with, in Natorp’s opinion, the necessity of 
92 N. H a r t m a n n: Systematische Methode. In: I d e m: Kleinere Schriften. Bd. 3: Vom 
Neukantianismus zur Ontologie. Berlin, 1958, p. 23.
93 P. N a t o r p: “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis…,” p. 283.
94 Ibid., p. 262.
95 Ibid., p. 265.
96 Ibid., pp. 265—266.
97 Ibid., pp. 267—268.
98 Ibid., p. 268.
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its justifying the way leading from consciousness. “At the beginning 
this way seems to lead to the aim.”99 However, in what way does it 
lead to the aim? “Therefore,” Natorp writes, “i n  g e n e r a l  the rela-
tion of what is subjective to what is objective in cognition should be 
explained with the relation of w h a t  i s  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  w h a t 
i s  g e n e r a l.”100 In any case, Natorp regards this opposition as 
an antagonism to the standpoints of Aristotle and Plato and under-
lines the fact that the question of relation between subjectivity and 
objectivity is not easy but is rather complex to the highest degree. 
“What is subjective is the first one when the problem of cognition is 
earlier posed than solved; but as given it cannot mean being given 
for cognition. Real beginnings and bases of cognition are rather al-
ways final o b j e c t i v e  u n i t i e s,”101 what is supposed to constitute 
an advantage of objective establishing over subjective establishing. 
Therefore Natorp states: “Science not only should but cannot start 
from anything else but from objective unities; there is no other pos-
sible beginning of cognition.”102 
4
In 1892, Carl Stumpf, who was a disciple of Rudolph Hermann 
Lotze and Franz Brentan, published an article on relation between 
psychology and theory of cognition103 in Abhandlungen der philoso­
phisch­philologischen Classe der Königlich Bayerichen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften. Stumpf made Eduard Zeller’s speech of 1862 the 
starting point of the consideration discussed in the article, and he 
  99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., p. 275.
101 Ibid., p. 284.
102 Ibid., pp. 284—285.
103 C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie”….
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said that this speech indicated the aim of the investigations of the 
theory of cognition, namely the source and truth of our cognition; 
however, it did not directly emphasise the meaning of psychology.104 
Stumpf underlines that Zeller only made it in 1877 and points to 
the second edition Über Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntniss­
theorie, which was completed with Supplements.105 At that time 
Zeller’s view was not the common one because as Stumpf was con-
vinced that there were a variety of standpoints in the “Neo-Kan-
tianist School” as he calls the views that refer to Kant.106 Stumpf 
pays attention to two opposite standpoints simultaneously: criticism 
and psychologism, while he clearly announces that intends to cause 
a confrontation. At the same time he underlines that Windelband 
considered Kant’s attitude to psychology in the text of 1877107 and 
came to the conclusion that Kant did not present his criticism in 
its full form because in his understanding, it still remained de-
pendent on psychology, which cannot surprise any expert on Neo-
Kantianism. “This dependence,” Windelband writes, “of criticism on 
psychological theory of its author, which cannot be covered by all 
his opposite statements, is already marked in the opening treatise 
[…].”108 At that moment Windelband mentions Hermann Cohen’s 
book, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, which, in his opinion, liberated 
Kant’s theory of cognition from psychology.
Stumpf assumes the conviction that Kant’s study should be com-
pleted, especially as far as schematism and transcendental deduction 
are concerned, as the starting point. Transcendental deduction, in 
his opinion, leads to understanding that “in nature and aspiring of 
our cognition there lies an introduction of the relation to the world 
104 See ibid., p. 467.
105 E. Z e l l e r: Zusätze (1877); I d e m: Über Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntniss­
theorie. 2. Aufl. In: I d e m: Vorträge und Abhandlungen. Zweite Sammlung. Leipzig, 1877, 
pp. 496—526.
106 See C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie…,” p. 467.
107 W. W i n d e l b a n d: “Über die verschiedenen Phasen der Kantischen Lehre vom Ding-
an-sich.” In: Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. Unter Mitwirkung von 
C. G ö r i n g, M. H e i n z e, W. W u n d t  herausgegeben von R. A v e n a r i u s. 1. Jahrgang. 
Leipzig, 1877, pp. 224—266.
108 Ibid., p. 237.
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of phenomena but not to understanding that the world of phenom-
ena must submit to it.”109 The problem is simply caused by our un-
derstanding of transcendental apperception and Stumpf refers to 
the distinction between consciousness and realisation, but — in ac-
cordance with what was stated earlier — he falsely attributes this 
distinction to Natorp.110 Indeed, not referring to Cohen, Natorp says 
in Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, that the 
psychological understanding of consciousness is divided into two el-
ements, that is, realisation and content.111 Realisation alone is too 
little to constitute the unity of the law and at the same time the 
unity of an object because it means “rather the most appropriate 
expression for defining subjectivity of coming to light, the character 
of a phenomenon as mental data [Datum].”112 
In this context the problem of psychology returns once again — 
the more so in that Stumpf pays attention to Hermann Cohen’s res-
ervations concerning his book of 1873.113 Cohen means that Stumpf, 
who he sees as a psychologist, thinks that one can reject qualities, 
but that there is no way to reject space. The author of Kants Theorie 
der Erfahrung claims that it is simple to refute this view because 
“one cannot imagine the space without quality.”114 The reader might 
be struck by the fact that Hermann Cohen regarded Carl Stumpf 
as a psychologist but one cannot forget that it was Stumpf who 
professed that “psychological investigations are indispensable for 
theoretician of cognition.”115 However, it seems that it is all about 
something else here. No mentally healthy person questions the 
importance of psychological research, and thus psychology, for the 
theory of cognition. Mentioned Paul Natorp spoke clearly about the 
opposition and the mutual reference of the subjective and objective 
establishment of cognition and thus psychology and the critique of 
cognition. One has to quote a longer fragment that shows the whole 
109 C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie…,” p. 478.
110 See ibid., p. 480.
111 See P. N a t o r p: Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode…, p. 112.
112 Ibid.
113 C. S t u m p f: Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung. Leipzig, 1873.
114 H. C o h e n: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. 2. neubearb. Aufl. …, p. 105.
115 C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie…,” p. 490.
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complexity of discussed relation between critique of cognition and 
psychology. “As we had to define subjective and psychological method 
as well as objective and critical one as an opposite relation, they 
both at the same time appeared to tightly create the whole and cor-
respond to each other and even cover each other [zusammenfallend]
in the whole area of their application and in the same meaning in 
which opposite movements A to B and B to A cover each other. In 
this way it is clear how the problem of critique of cognition seemed 
for many people solved in the psychology of cognition and how, on 
the other hand — when the objective character of critical method 
was explained — quite opposite, psychological problem seemed to 
be solved till the end in the critical problem. Both views turned out 
to be erroneous. Both problems, the problem of objective and sub-
jective establishing, tightly correspond to each other, however they 
remain different from each other and even opposite.”116 This frag-
ment from Natorp’s book shows that the question is not unequivo-
cal and requires that the right distinctions be made.
Stumpf’s considerations were aimed in a direction other than 
those of Cohen and Natorp though. It was Willy Moog (1888—1935), 
who regarded Stumpf as a psychologist placed between psychology 
and theory of cognition. For this reason Stumpf is the one who em-
phasised the meaning of psychology for philosophy. “Psychology has 
got a fundamental meaning for Stumpf; also his theory of cognition is 
in an essential way psychologically oriented, while it does not assess 
logic in a fair way as it includes it to practical sciences.”117 Moog’s 
standpoint is confirmed by Gerhard Lahmann, who pointed out the 
close relationship between philosophy and psychology. “Stumpf,” he 
writes in his controversial book, “did not have to be a philosopher 
who he was, he did not have to start from ‘descriptive’ psychology 
of Brentan to know that ‘psychology’ includes the essence of purely 
philosophical problems. In this way he establishes psychology, logic, 
theory of cognition in the relationship in which psychology is not to 
a lesser extent in charge of ‘the source of notions’, origin of cognition 
116 See P. N a t o r p: Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode…, p. 121.
117 W. M o o g: Die deutsche Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts in ihren Hauptrichtungen 
und ihren Grundproblemen. Stuttgart, 1922, p. 161.
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[…]. Also for him psychology is not a natural science but it belongs 
to the humanities.”118
“As a positive task in the service of theory of cognition — Stumpf 
writes — psychology is to explain more exactly the origins of time 
and space presentations, especially presentations of relations 
[Verhältnisvorstellungen].”119 Thus, Stumpf was convinced that psy-
chology is a fundamental science, although he did emphasise the 
close relation between psychology and philosophy. Therefore, he con-
sidered Johann Nicolaus Tetens (1738—1807)120 to be a thinker who 
investigated the relations of representations in the most decisive 
way and said that he was a psychologist and would make a clear 
distinction between his standpoint and Kant’s criticism. Stumpf 
underlined that criticism aims at showing forms of eyewitnessing 
and categories that are independent of psychology, although he, as 
a philosopher, was not convinced about this possibility. According 
to Stumpf, there is a very strong relation between psychology and 
the theory of cognition. “Kant expressed and wanted to express any 
statement of psychological source of eyewitnessing and forms of 
thinking in ‘a priori’; not only statement on their significance for 
cognition. He wanted to say and he says this often enough that they 
are not possible to be analysed as a priori notions and are not given 
sensuously as impressive contents. This negation of possibilities to 
analyse is also a psychological statement […].”121 Stumpf refers to 
Hermann Cohen in this context, stating that he also considers the 
significance of psychology for the theory of cognition. “These investi-
gations,” the author of Kants Theorie der Erfahrung writes, “of facts 
of consciousness in cognition, which he establishes as unavailable in 
psychological analysis, that is considered as a priori elements of con-
sciousness, are called ‘metaphysical periphrasis’ by Kant. And this is 
an indispensable initial condition of transcendental periphrasis.”122 
118 G. L e h m a n n: Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart. Stuttgart, 1942, pp. 109—
110.
119 C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie…,” p. 490.
120 See J.N. T e t e n s: Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre 
Entwickelung. Bd. 1—2. Leipzig, 1777.
121 C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie…,” p. 493.
122 H. C o h e n: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. 2. neubearb. Aufl…, p. 74.
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The problem is not the fact that there is no psychology in Kant’s and 
Cohen’s texts but its definition. One can agree with the thesis that 
was proposed by Stumpf with reference to psychology. “Negligence 
of psychology,” he writes, “is not, as it is presented quite often, in-
voluntary and unimportant feature but it constitutes a fundamental 
detriment of Kant’s philosophizing.”123 All of the followers of Jakob 
Friedrich Fries would support this thesis, including Jürgen Bona 
Meyer, Hans Cornelius and Leonard Nelson. However, the way to 
define psychology still remained a problem. The fact that Stumpf 
refers to Christoph Sigwart (1830—1904) is not laudable to him be-
cause Logic124 of the latter one is considered to be one of the most 
important works belonging to psychologism. In this context Edmund 
Husserl in the first volume of Logical Investigations talks about 
logic of Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1798—1854), John Stuart Mill 
(1806—1873) and Sigwart, considering them to be representatives of 
psychologism.125 Stumpf goes even further, for he emphasised that it 
was Fichte who introduced the notion of “consciousness in general” 
and referring to German positivist Ernst Laas (1837—1885)126 and 
he claims that this did not happen in Kant’s philosophy. 
The question of understanding psychology causes us to refer to 
phenomenology. Firstly, because Brentano, one of Stumpf’s teacher, 
also worked on psychology as an empirical science, and in draw-
ing a distinction between genetic and descriptive psychology he de-
scribed his psychology as descriptive psychology. Secondly, because 
Husserl refers to Stumpf, to whom he dedicated the first volume 
of his Logical Investigations, which was the result of the fact that 
Husserl presented his postdoctoral dissertation Über den Begriff der 
Zahl127 at Stumpf’s. Moreover, when he published the first volume 
of Logical Investigations in 1900, he also referred to Stumpf. “It 
would therefore be,” Husserl writes, “circular to try to give logic 
123 C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie…,” p. 493.
124 Ch. S i g w a r t: Logik. Bd. 1: Die Lehre vom Urteil, vom Begriff und vom Schluss; Bd. 2: 
Die Methodenlehre. Tübingen, 1873—1878.
125 See E. H u s s e r l: Logical Investigations. Vol. 1…, p. 90.
126 E. L a a s: Kants Analogien der Erfahrung. Eine kritische Studie über die Grundlagen 
der theoretischen Philosophie. Berlin, 1876.
127 E. H u s s e r l: Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen. Halle, 1887.
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a first foundation in psychology.”128 In this context he refers to three 
philosophers, two whom presented the same opinion, namely they 
share Husserl’s anti-psychologism and the third one who had quite 
an opposite opinion. The “Allies” of Husserl were Rudolph Hermann 
Lotze and Paul Natorp and the one that had a different opinion 
is Carl Stumpf. At first Husserl indicates § 332 of the second edi-
tion of Lotze’s Logic (although he cites the wrong pages), in which 
he rejects the possibility of justifying thinking laws on the way of 
referring to the psychological processes that happen in the human 
mind.129 Then Husserl refers to the text of Natorp that is analyzed 
here, which was devoted to the difference between objective and 
subjective establishment of cognition. “Ascertainment that all sense 
of logic as general and establishing truth of theory of cognition will 
be abolished when we only allow to make it dependent on the rules 
of some special science, namely psychology […] makes subjective 
approach impossible to accept.”130 Natorp’s anti-psychologism ap-
peared at the same time, which certainly did not arouse any doubts 
among the experts of Marburg Neo-Kantianism. Iso Kern was also 
a thinker who particularly emphasised the importance of Natorp 
and his text for Husserl’s anti-psychologism, even at the expense 
of the importance of Gottlob Frege’s output.131 
The thinker whose attitude was not accepted by Husserl was, as 
has already been mentioned, Carl Stumpf. In other words Husserl, 
a disciple of Brentan, did not accept the way in which Carl Stumpf, 
the other (older) disciple of Brentan, understood psychology. For 
it was not possible for Husserl to agree with Stumpf’s thesis that 
stated: “Investigating the source of n o t i o n s, not only those of ab-
solute but also of relative contents is the old task of psychology. […] 
While looking for the most general, immediately convincing t r u t h s 
128 E. H u s s e r l: Logical Investigations. Vol. 1…, p. 95.
129 See H. L o t z e: System der Philosophie. Theil 1: Drei Bücher der Logik. Leipzig, 1874, 
pp. 530—532.
130 P. N a t o r p: “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis…,” p. 264.
131 See I. K e r n: Husserl und Kant: Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu 
Kant und zum Neukantianismus. Den Haag, 1964. See also J. S i d o r e k: Słowo wstępne. 
In: E. H u s s e r l: Badania logiczne. T. 1: Prolegomena do czystej logiki. Tłum. J. S i d o r e k. 
Przejrzał A. Półtawski, Warszawa, 2006 pp. IX—XXXVI.
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is a matter of the theory of cognition.”132 This statement shows the 
close relation between psychology and the theory of cognition but 
by no means in the meaning that was given to psychology by Bren-
tano, Husserl or Natorp. The last one proved that one of the most 
important tasks of psychology is the reconstruction of what is direct, 
what is just given to consciousness133 and at the same time — refer-
ring to Kant — he underlined the close relation of psychology under-
stood in this way and the criticism of cognition. He also pointed out 
the necessity of drawing a distinction between “pure” philosophical 
psychology and “empirical” psychology.134 After all the co-founder of 
the Marburg School wrote in another place: “The first basic philo-
sophical domain is the science of basic principles of not only formal 
but also material or objective [gegenständlichen] truth of cognition: 
l o g i c  o r  c r i t i c i s m  o f  c o g n i t i o n.”135 Nevertheless Stumpf 
understands psychology in a quite different way. “Psychology has 
a completely other task, on account of our conviction about the outer 
world and our presentations of its features. It does not have to e x -
c u s e  scientific assumptions in this respect but it is supposed to 
e x p l a i n  general direct trust in the outer world, n o  m a t t e r  i f 
i t  i s  t r u e  o r  f a l s e; I mean in the outer world as it appears 
for us: colourful humming and uproarious, fragrant and tasty, intro-
ducing only some corrections which is brought by an ordinary con-
sciousness trained by experience of many sensual illusions. If also 
here the beginnings of scientific cognition are shining through the 
same as in the indicated reference, then psychology considers them 
only as forces cooperating with other forces.”136 However, Stumpf 
was conscious of the fact that psychologism does not constitute an 
132 C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie…,” p. 501.
133 See P. N a t o r p: Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode…, p. 88.
134 See ibid., p. 120.
135 P. N a t o r p: Philosophische Propädeutik (Allgemeine Einleitung in die Philosophie und 
Anfangsgründe der Logik, Ethik und Psychologie) in Leitsätzen zu akademischen Vorlesungen. 
2. Aufl. Marburg, 1905, p. 10. It is worth mentioning here that it is Cohen who talks about 
the criticism of cognition in Das Princip der Infinitesimal­Methode und seine Geschichte. Ein 
Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Erkenntnisskritik (Berlin, 1883), but this notion was used for 
the first time by Otto L i e b m a n n  in the book Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit. Philosophische 
Untersuchungen (Straßburg, 1876).
136 C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie…,” pp. 506—507.
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alternative to criticism, and therefore, he offered an indirect way 
that consists in the close cooperation of these two attitudes. 
Stumpf underlines the importance of psychology in philosophical 
investigations in Supplement137 which is at the end of the article, 
when he specifically refers again to Tetens who — as Stumpf noted 
— is called the “German Locke” by Karl Rosenkranz.138 Stumpf em-
phasised that it was Jürgen Bona Meyer who had mentioned Jo-
hann Eduard Erdmann (1805—1892), because the latter stressed 
the importance of Tetens to Kant’s understanding psychology.139 
Erdmann says that — in accordance with Johann Georg Hamann’s 
opinion — Tetens’s book was supposed to lie on Kant’s desk. “In 
logic,” Erdmann writes about Kant, “Wolff and his school were his 
authorities, while in psychology — Tetens specially.”140 “Erdmann 
is also important for the other reason, namely because,” as Rudolf 
Eisler claims, “he is the author of the notion “psychologism.”141 
Stumpf devotes all of his Supplement to emphasising the importance 
of Tetens for the development of psychology because he thinks that 
Tetens refers to psychology when it is necessary. This is probably 
the most important argument of all of the followers of psychology. 
The problem in the dispute on psychologism is not to eradicate psy-
chology from the investigation but to set limits on it. “Inclination 
to psychologism,” as Stumpf writes with reference to Tetens’s sci-
ence, “only appears in the science on necessity.”142 These analyses 
prove — in the eyes of Stumpf — that Tetens was not free from 
psychologism.
137 C. S t u m p f: Anhang. In: I d e m: Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie…, pp. 509—516.
138 Rosenkranz was supposed to make it in the final twelfth volume of Kant’s works. See 
K. R o s e n k r a n z: “Geschichte der Kant’schen Philosophie.” In: Immanuel Kant’s sämmtliche 
Werke. Hrsg. von K. R o s e n k r a n z, F.W. S c h u b e r t. Theil 12: Geschichte der Kant’schen 
Philosophie. Leipzig, 1842, p. 65.
139 See J. B o n a  M e y e r: Kants Psychologie…, p. 60.
140 J.E. E r d m a n n: Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neu­
ern Philosophie. Bd. 3. Abth. 1: Die Entwicklung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant. Erster 
Theil. Leipzig, 1848, p. 196.
141 See R. E i s l e r: Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe. Historisch­quellenmässig 
bearbeitet. Bd. 2: O—Z. 2. Aufl. Berlin, 1904, p. 164.
142 C. S t u m p f: Anhang…, p. 514.
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The last text that Leonard Nelson referred to is the postdoctoral 
dissertation of Max Scheler from 1900 entitled Die transszendentale 
und die psychologische Methode which was published for the second 
time in 1922.143 This text was created in Jena where Scheler pre-
sented his postdoctoral dissertation, and when more than twenty 
years later he was preparing the second edition he considered two 
purposes. Firstly, to explain some of the questions for since he ini-
tially did not know Husserl’s Logical Investigations and secondly, 
as a defence against the criticism that he experienced from the 
representatives of the Marburg School and psychologism.144 Scheler 
emphasised the necessity of making investigations concerning the 
method because — in his opinion — there are no purely philosophi-
cal considerations, and moreover, as he noted that “philosophy is 
characterized by much more intimate dependence on its method 
than other sciences.”145 It is true that, as Scheler continues, this 
problem is considered here as was done by Hans Vaihinger in his 
comments on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,146 but the problem is 
not Windelband’s motto to unite Neo-Kantianists “to understand 
Kant is to go beyond him” but his instruction about “how to go be-
yond him.”147 It requires a comment because there is still another 
issue, namely the anti-Kantianist character of Scheler’s text. When 
Wilhelm Windelband in the preface to Präludien stated that “to un-
derstand Kant is to go beyond him”148 in the preface to Präludien 
in no way did he mean to break with Kant’s thought. The inten-
143 M. S c h e l e r: Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode. Eine grundsätz­
liche Erörterung zur philosophischen Methodik. 2. Aufl. Leipzig, 1922 (further citation from 
this edition).
144 See ibid., p. V.
145 Ibid., p. 2.
146 H. V a i h i n g e r: Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Zum hundertjäh­
rigen Jubiläum derselben. Bd. 1—2. Stuttgart, 1881, Stuttgart—Berlin—Leipzig, 1892.
147 M. S c h e l e r: Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode…, p. 3.
148 W. W i n d e l b a n d: Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Einführung in die Philosophie. 
Bd. 1. 4. Aufl. Tübingen, 1911, p. IV.
Andrzej J. Noras: The debate on the method of philosophy… 51
tion of Windelband, the main representative of Neo-Kantianism, 
was totally different. He did not mean to go beyond him; he rather 
meant going beyond the literal meaning of his philosophy, which 
was characteristic of early Neo-Kantianism (so-called Kant’s philol-
ogy) unlike Scheler who was anti-Kantianist which is shown, among 
others, in the analysed text. It also distinguishes Max Scheler’s 
postdoctoral dissertation, the book that is only occasionally referred 
to, in contrast to other texts that are analysed here. The author of 
Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode, unlike other 
investigators that are analysed, did not protect transcendentalism 
against Fries’s “psychologism” or the other way round — he did not 
protect Fries’s attitude towards criticism of Neo-Kantianists, nor 
did he recognise the necessity of combining these two attitudes. If 
one is to assume that Kantianism is the third attitude, situated be-
tween the two extremes of modern philosophy, that is, dogmatism 
and skepticism, then Scheler’s standpoint is a Kantianist one. For 
Scheler, in criticising both the transcendental and psychological 
methods, wants to establish a new method of philosophy. 
Scheler emphasised the philosophical character of analyses con-
cerning the method, which is worth taking into account when we 
analyse his output. It is more important because Neo-Kantianists 
seemed to set the tone for methodological considerations, which 
are nowadays very often called metaphilosophical considerations. 
Fortunately, Scheler is a thinker of the 20th century and shares 
the classical opinion that meta-philosophy constitutes an integral 
part of philosophy. “It is clear,” he notes in a footnote, “that every 
representative of detailed science is right establishing methodical 
research. But he does it ‘as a philosopher’. He is just a philosopher 
when he does it correctly.”149 His initial remark concerning psychol-
ogy is equally important, especially in the context of problem being 
analysed, although Fries’s name does not appear here, and it con-
cerns problems with its understanding. “Psychology,” Scheler writes, 
“is once defined as natural science (for example M ü n s t e r b e r g, 
R i c k e r t, W i n d e l b a n d) and it is denied any meaning for the hu-
149 M. S c h e l e r: Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode…, p. 9.
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manities, and once it is explained as the basis of all the humanities 
(Wundt).”150 Such methodological arbitrariness requires decisiveness 
especially in that, on the one hand this is arbitrariness of detailed 
sciences, while on the other hand, the sources of such arbitrariness 
are seen by Scheler in Hegel’s output, which provides evidence that 
detailed sciences have been absorbed by philosophy. Scheler tackles 
the problem of the method because he thinks it is essential to get 
out of the situation in which the detailed sciences argue over the 
method and philosophy remains indifferent towards it. 
Scheler’s text is the most extensive of those pointed out by Nel-
son, and therefore it has to be treated the shortest way now. The 
author of Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode was 
looking for the answer to the question about the method in modern 
philosophy and states that three features differentiate it from the 
understanding of the method in the past: independence, exclusivity 
and creative power.151 Scheler analyses two methods more closely, 
namely the transcendental and psychological methods. First of all, 
he analyses the transcendental method taking two assumptions. 
The first is the conviction that Kant did not use the transcendental 
method in his philosophy; the second is that the necessity of ac-
cepting that the transcendental method is subject to modifications 
according to the attitudes of different philosophers — the ones who 
refer to Kant — while Scheler only mentions Cohen, Alois Riehl 
and Windelband. Scheler thinks that the transcendental method is 
characterised by:
a) its reductive character, which means that it has to find arguments 
to fir existing facts;
b) a conviction that judgments constitute both a starting point as 
well as a finishing one (the objective and logical character of this 
reduction appears in this);
c) concentrating on the attempt to elaborate a critical criterion of any 
cognitions (so he shows a claim to be the criticism of cognition);
d) leading to cognitive principles that are of a formal character;
150 Ibid., p. 11.
151 See ibid., p. 17.
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e) including the principles detected into the notion of scientific judg-
ment.152
Scheler then makes a detailed criticism of such an understanding 
of the transcendental method that he mentioned in his dissertation, 
which also dealt with the problem of principles.153 Later he takes up 
the problem of the psychological method while he emphasises that he 
does not mean the psychological method but rather the psychologi-
cal method in philosophy, so those directions which “more adequately 
describe psychology as a basic science for all philosophical disciplines 
or, more radically, they describe it as one scientific philosophy in 
general.”154 He associates the psychological method with, among oth-
ers, such thinkers as: Theodor Lipps (1851—1914), Ernst Laas, Wil-
liam James (1842—1910), Richard Avenarius and Hans Cornelius.
Why does Scheler criticise both the transcendental and psycho-
logical methods? Because he thinks that this view — at least at 
the time when he wrote his postdoctoral dissertation — that like 
his teacher, Rudolfem Euckenem (1846—1926) he accepted that the 
proper method of philosophy is the noologic method.155 The reverend 
Jan Krokos — when referring to Historisches Wörterbuch der Phi­
losophie — stated that these notions were used for the first time 
by Eucken in his work of 1888.156 “Therefore science,” Eucken wrote 
there, “has to put noological method before psychological method 
to investigate spiritual reality.”157 However, the problem lies in the 
fact that already in 1885 Eucken published the Prolegomena to 
the book of 1888 in which he talked about noological proceedings. 
“So as,” Eucken wrote, “we do not deal with the soul but with the 
spirit not with yuc», but with noàj, therefore we are choosing the 
152 See ibid., pp. 37—41. Cf. J. K r o k o s: Fenomenologia Edmunda Husserla, Aleksandra 
Pfändera, Maxa Schelera. Warszawa, 1992, p. 145. [Edmund Husserl’s, Aleksander Pfänder’s, 
Max Scheler’s Phenomenology].
153 M. S c h e l e r: Beiträge zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und 
ethischen Prinzipien. Jena, 1899.
154 M. S c h e l e r: Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode…, p. 144.
155 See ibid., p. 179.
156 See J. K r o k o s: Fenomenologia Edmunda Husserla., p. 168.
157 R. E u c k e n: Die Einheit des Geisteslebens in Bewusstsein und That der Menschheit. 
Leipzig, 1888, p. 451
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expression: noological proceedings.”158 Scheler follows his master 
and at the end of his book he gives twelve theses that in his opin-
ion characterise philosophy and its method.159 According to these, 
neither the transcendental method nor the psychological method 
is the proper method in philosophy. The noologic method should 
be the method of philosophy, which he adopted from his master. 
Reverend Krokos referred to the book of citizen of Katowice Erich 
Przywara SJ (1889—1972) who treats Die transszendentale und die 
psychologische Methode as the first appearance of “phenomenologi-
cal” method.160 Indeed, in 1900 it was still unknown but later an 
awareness of the distinction between Kantianism and Neo-Kantian-
ism was surely much clearer. 
There is still another problem Scheler paid attention to, and that 
is the understanding of psychology in philosophy and thus defining 
its place within the frames of transcendentalism because — refer-
ring to Hans Vaihinger — he says that “so called ‘transcendental and 
psychological’ method constitutes s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a completely 
necessary element of Kant’s reasoning.”161 What is more, Scheler sup-
ports himself here with the authority of Vaihinger who rightly claims 
that one cannot simply ignore the psychological aspect of cognition, 
as if it did not exist and as if there was not a problem of psychol-
ogy in the theory of cognition. Meanwhile, such a view is presented 
by, for example, Alois Riehl, who criticised both Fries and Herbart, 
and their philosophy saying that they both constitute of “p s y c h o -
l o g i c a l  superstition.”162 At the beginning of his book Riehl speaks 
openly: “C r i t i c a l  K a n t ’ s  p h i l o s o p h y  d o e s  n o t  k n o w 
a n y  p s y c h o l o g y.”163 It is worth referring to the very Vaihinger 
158 R. E u c k e n: Prolegomena zu Forschungen über die Einheit des Geisteslebens in 
Bewusstsein und That der Menschheit. Leipzig, 1885, p. 99.
159 See M. S c h e l e r: Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode…, pp. 179—
181. See Supplement at the end of the article.
160 E. P r z y w a r a SJ: Religionsbegründung. Max Scheler — J.H. Newman. Freiburg im 
Breisgau, 1923, p. 7. Cf. J. K r o k o s: Fenomenologia Edmunda Husserla…, p. 168.
161 M. S c h e l e r: Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode…, p. 27.
162 See A. R i e h l: Der philosophische Kriticismus und seine Bedeutung für die positive 
Wissenschaft. Bd. 1: Geschichte und Methode des philosophischen Kriticismus. Leipzig, 1876, 
p. 294.
163 Ibid., p. 8.
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because essence of the matter is included in his statement. “If,” he 
writes in Comments to “Critique of pure reason,” “purely psycho-
logical attitude is a bigger mistake than the one which is purely 
concerning theory of cognition, psychological side does not have to 
be ignored at all. […] The question about possibility is generally 
a question of c o n d i t i o n s  and they are here partially psychologi-
cal and partially purely concerning the theory.”164 Of course, it is im-
portant that the question about psychology does not reduce itself to 
the question about empirical psychology. For this one, as Vaihinger 
notices, was rejected by Kant. Nevertheless, it is a question about 
“transcendental psychology.” Scheler is aware of this. “What Kant 
actually rejected is not every psychological and genetic method in 
general but exclusively empirical and psychological method, which 
we knew long before Nouveaux Essais by Leibniz, and which was 
specifically presented by L o c k e .”165
6
Leonard Nelson pointed to these briefly analysed texts in his arti-
cle “Jakob Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker,” which was 
printed in 1905. Thus Nelson could not have known about some 
important texts, although it has to be mentioned that he does not 
systematically refer to the main representative of the German psy-
chologism, Theodor Lipps (1851—1914). Nelson must have known 
two of the books that had been written by Lipps, namely Grund­
tatsachen des Seelenlebens166 and Leitfaden der Psychologie167 al-
164 H. V a i h i n g e r: Commentar zu Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Zum hundertjäh­
rigen Jubiläum derselben. Bd. 1. Stuttgart, 1881, pp. 323—324.
165 M. S c h e l e r: Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode…, p. 29.
166 T. L i p p s: Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens. Bonn, 1883.
167 T. L i p p s: Leitfaden der Psychologie. Leipzig, 1903.
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though he did not refer to them. Which texts did Nelson not know? 
Obviously, there is no way to count them all but it is worth point-
ing out that a few years later two important Neo-Kantianist texts 
appeared, one which was delivered and printed in 1909 and the 
second one in the same year. I am referring to the texts of Emil 
Lask168 and Heinrich Rickert.169 These texts are extremely impor-
tant for understanding Neo-Kantianism and transcendentalism at 
the Baden School.
Analyses showed that a fundamental problem of transcendental 
philosophy is its understanding of psychology, which at the same 
time complicates the whole question, because one should in fact ad-
mit that an understanding of psychology constitutes a determinant 
to the attitudes presented here. It is not the fact that psychology 
was awarded a place in the system of sciences but the fact that 
Kant was not innocent here by admitting only empirical psychol-
ogy. “Metaphysics of thinking nature,” he writes in the final parts 
of Critique of Pure Reason, “is called psychology […].”170 The thinker 
from Königsberg poses a question about the place of psychology in 
philosophy and he states that it belongs to applied philosophy. “One 
has to send empirical psychology to the exile from metaphysics.”171 
In this way one can — obviously only with a draft-point at some 
trends in the understanding of psychology. The first one includes 
all of those thinkers who will began their attempt of looking for 
its place and justifying of it in relation to empirical psychology. 
Jakob Friedrich Fries, who proposed that there are three sciences 
168 E. L a s k: Gibt es einen “Primat der praktischen Vernunft” in der Logik? In: Bericht über 
den III. internationalen Kongreß für Philosophie zu Heidelberg. 1. bis 5. September 1908. Hrsg. 
von Th. E l s e n h a n s. Heidelberg, 1909, pp. 671—679, and then in: E. L a s k: Gesammelte 
Schriften. Hrsg. von E. H e r r i g e l. Bd. 1. Tübingen, 1923, pp. 347—356. Polish translation: 
Czy istnieje „prymat rozumu praktycznego” w logice? Trans. A.J. N o r a s. In: Neokantyzm 
badeński i marburski. Antologia tekstów…, pp. 153—159.
169 H. R i c k e r t: “Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie. Transscendentalpsychologie und 
Transscendentallogik.” Kant­Studien 1909, Bd. 14, p. 169—228. Polish translation: “Dwie 
drogi teorii poznania. Psychologia transcendentalna i logika transcendentalna.” Trans. 
T. K u b a l i c a. In: Neokantyzm badeński i marburski. Antologia tekstów…, pp. 73—119.
170 “Die Metaphysik der denkenden Natur [emphasis mine — A.J.N.] heißt Psychologie 
[…].” I. K a n t: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. B 874. 
171 Ibid., B 876.
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that investigate the nature of the man, namely the physiology of 
human body, mental anthropology and comparative anthropology, 
belongs in this group. “P s y c h o l o g i c a l  a n t h r o p o l o g y, also 
called p s y c h o l o g y, which explores the nature of human spirit 
according to inner spiritual self-cognition.”172 All of those who fol-
low the psychological trend will refer to him. The second trend at-
tracts those thinkers who agree to go beyond this understanding of 
consciousness, and therefore they try to grasp psychology in a tran-
scendental way, by asking about the conditions of consciousness and 
not about its actual course. It has been said that Hermann Cohen 
contrasted consciousness with realisation in order to avoid being 
suspected of psychologism. Attempts of representatives of both the 
Marburg School as well those of the Baden School will serve the 
presentation of transcendental consciousness, free of empiricism. 
Scheler, who resigned from both the empirical and transcendental 
understanding of psychology, belong to the third trend — one can 
say that they are for understanding of consciousness that is char-
acteristic to phenomenology. Descriptive psychology, starting from 
Franz Brentan, which assumes non-associationistic understanding 
of the consciousness is characterised by William James, Henry Berg-
son and Edmund Husserl.
172 J.F. F r i e s: Handbuch der psychischen Anthropologie oder der Lehre von der Natur 
des menschliches Geistes. Bd. 1. Jena, 1820, p. 2.
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S u p p l e m e n t: Theses*
1. No absolute constant (except from principles of formal logic) or 
obvious data [Datum] exists from which philosophy may start, either 
as metaphysics, the theory of cognition, ethics or aesthetics. Neither 
mathematics axioms or natural history theorems nor “experience” 
(in the transcendental meaning) or momentary impressions or any 
intuitive, primary certainty of moral kind1 can lay justified claims 
to the value of such data [Datums].
2. Philosophy is the science of the spirit. The theory of cognition, 
ethics and aesthetics are fairly independent and detailed disciplines 
[Spezialdisziplinen] of philosophy.2 They tell us how the spirit is re-
ally defined (and not how it “should” be defined) because of the im-
manent aims in its essence, which are real cognition, morally good 
acting and experiencing beauty. However, basic philosophical science 
remains superior to these detailed disciplines (substantially, if not 
also genetically h prèth filosof…a), which looks to define the spirit 
as homogeneous potency (if not even a “simple one”). This basic sci-
ence might be called “critical metaphysics,” without changing the 
traditional meaning of this word. 
3. The transcendental method cannot cope with the problems of 
philosophy.
4. The psychological method cannot do it either.
5. The noologic method is an attempt to combine the methods of 
transcendental philosophy and transcendental psychology, which are 
partially too little separated in Kant’s view and partially fall into 
contradiction with each other.
6. Its basic notions are: “the world of work” and “the spiritual life-
style” [Lebensform].
* Basis of translation: M. S c h e l e r: Die transszendentale und die psychologische 
Metho de. Eine grundsätzliche Erörterung zur philosophischen Methodik. 2. Aufl. Leipzig, 
1922, pp. 179—181.
1 For example in the meaning of J.G. Fichte or (apart from other contrasts) J.F. Herbart.
2 Independent “philosophy of nature” if it was meant to be something more than an 
investigation referring to the cognitive principles and cognitive methods of natural history 
(it constituted a part of theory of cognition as such), after separating those disciplines from 
philosophy, which is described as “natural philosophy” by Newton and also today by Eng-
lishmen, might also be something that can hardly be separated. The philosophy of religion 
coincides with our notion of “religion.”
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7. No content, while existing and combining claim to importance 
with indissoluble unity is a “mental fact” which might be scientifi-
cally known in the course of introspection. 
8. “Importance,” which would not be the “importance” of something 
real, is impossible to think of.
9. A spiritual lifestyle cannot be understood as a product of the 
development mental facts.
10. We understand the “world of work” to be the generally recog-
nised causative relations [Werkzusammenhänge] of human culture. 
There is not any obvious data [Datum] in itself although it is a “well-
established phenomenon.” One should not ask about the logical pos-
sibility of definite scientific results of detailed disciplines [Einzeldis­
ziplinen], resp. about the possibility of ambiguous “experience” but 
about the real possibility (at first as an attempt) of a described world 
of work.
11. Spirit (at the same time its element — the mind), ignoring 
the principles of formal logic, has been a problematic notion as to its 
content since the beginning of investigations. It is (ignoring its form 
of realisation that is originally meant to happen) this x which was 
enabled by the world of work. As the world of work becomes richer 
and richer through the course of human history, it is not possible to 
definitely define the content of the notion of the spirit. It is impos-
sible to systematically introduce a priori principles for any “possible 
experience.” Formal principles have too much content because of the 
importance of any possible (historical) experience, and taking into 
account its more energetic uses in a historically defined culture — 
too little content.
12. The only property of the notion of spirit, which is legally valid 
for a given state of human life, consists in the fact that owing to it 
the world of work, which was invented as a result of its causative 
reduction, is becoming closed, and at the same time, that differently 
expressed, the spiritual deed that caused the choice of the world of 
work out of all that “was” [Gewesenen] turns out to be identical to 
this spiritual deed by which the world of work was possible. 
Translated by Ewa Woœ
60 Studies in history of philosophy
Andrzej J. Noras
The debate on the method of philosophy  
at the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries
Keywords:  Max Scheler, Leonard Nelson, method, Neo-kantianism, criticism
S u m m a r y
The starting point of the analysis provided in this paper is a discussion of how philo-
sophical method is understood by Leonard Nelson who draws upon the lines of Jakob 
Friedrich Fries. From this perspective Nelson points out two ways of argumenta-
tion, two methods or standpoints: metaphysical and anthropological, objective one 
and subjective one, critical and genetic, epistemological and psychological or tran-
scendental and psychological. These distinctions find their justification in concepts 
by philosophers with which Nelson polimicizes defending Fries’ standpoint: Kuno 
Fischer, Paul Natorp, Wilhelm Windelband, Carl Stumpf and Max Scheler. On the 
ground of analysis of their conceptions Nelson argues that admittedly they follow 
Kant, yet Kant — unlike Fries — has not included the psychological aspect of cogni-
tion. 
Andrzej J. Noras
Der Streit um Methode der Philosophie  
um die Wende des 19. zum 20. Jh.
Schlüsselwörter:  Max Scheler, Leonard Nelson, Methode, Neukantianismus, Kri-
tizismus
Z u s a m m e n f a s s u n g
Der Ausgangspunkt für diese Erwägungen ist die philosophische Methode von 
Leonard Nelson, der in seiner Philosophie an Jakob Friedrich Fries anknüpft. Aus 
dieser Perspektive bestätigt er das Vorhandensein von zwei Hauptmethoden der 
Argumentation.
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Es sind: metaphysische und anthropologische, objektive und subjektive, kritische 
und genetische, erkenntnistheoretische und psychologische oder transzendentale 
und psychologische Methoden. Solche Unterscheidungen haben ihre Berechtigung 
in der Lehre von den Philosophen, gegen welche Nelson, den Standpunkt von Fries 
verteidigend, polemisiert. Zu diesen Denkern gehören: Kuno Fischer, Paul Natorp, 
Wilhelm Windelband, Carl Stumpf und Max Scheler. Nelson analysiert ihre Lehren 
angesichts der genannten Methoden und kommt zur Überzeugung, dass sie zwar in 
die Fußtapfen von Kant treten, doch im Gegensatz zu Fries die psychologische Seite 
der Erkenntnis nicht in Rücksicht nehmen.
